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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

statute of limitations did not bar a suit against a corporate
defendant, even though the summons was delivered in the wrong
county. The extension was allowed despite delivery to the
sheriff's office in New York County instead of in Queens County
where the corporation could have been served. The court said
that "'an error in the choice of the proper sheriff's office should
be disregarded if no real prejudice to the defendant . . .'" would
result.4
It must be noted, however, that the courts in both Kosofsky
and Wieboldt were dealing specifically with a county in New
York City. The CPLR, in at least one instance, provides that
for a specific purpose, the five counties within New York City
are to be considered one.5 Therefore, it is conceivable that the
ruling in Wiaboldt may be limited in that respect, i.e., applicable
only in New York City.
ARTICLE 3 -

JURISDICTION AND SEvicn, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT

CPLR 302: Held applicable to person who was domiciliary at
tinw of tort.
The Court of Appeals, in State v. Dav4es.o affirmed a ruling
by the appellate division, third department, that CPLR 302 is
applicable to an individual who was a domiciliary at the time he
committed a tort and a nondomiciliary at the time of service upon
him. This affirmance by New York's highest Court seemingly
ends the debate 7 as to whether a possible gap was created by the
language of 302 which might have allowed a nondomiciliary to

4 Id. at 932, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
B CPLR 3110. The court may also have been aware of the Advisory
Committee's report concerning 203(b) (4) wherein it suggested that delivery
to the sheriff of New York City should be allowed to be made in any of
the five counties of New York City for convenience of administration.
1 Wmxs m r, KoraN & MinnR, NEw YoRx Civn. PRAcTcCE f203.15 (1965).
6 IS N.Y.2d 950, 223 N.E.2d 570, 277 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1966) (memoThe prior history of the case is discussed in The
randum decision).
Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHaN's L. Rgv. 303, 309
(1966), and The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S
L. Ray. 121, 129 (1966).
7See O'Conner v. Wells, 43 Misc. 2d 1073 (Sup. Ct Greene County
1965) (held CPLR 302 applicable to one a domiciliary at the time of the act) ;
Voskrenskava v. Bary, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1964, at 9,
col. 2. Contra, 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary 83 (1964),
which stated that 302 could not be read to allow jurisdiction to be acquired
over a nondomiciliary defendant who committed one of the prescribed
acts while a domiciliary of the state.
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avoid being brought to task in New York for a tort committed
while he was a domiciliary here.
CPLR 308(3): Server's testimony as to custom and habit allowed
exigent circumstances found.
In Miller v. Alda Corp.." a summons and complaint were left
at the defendant Hasso's office. The papers were delivered to
the defendant several days later by one of his business associates.9
The court held the service upon the defendant improper under
CPLR 308(1), since it failed to meet that section's requirement
of personal delivery,' 0 and no special circumstances sufficient to
justify departure from the requirement was found."
It cited
two instances where redelivery to the party to be served by one
other than plaintiff's agent would generally be allowed: when
the redelivery is "so close both in time and space that it can be
classified as part of the same act"' 2 and when the defendant
attempts to evade or block service. 13 Additionally, it mentioned
some recent decisions upholding re-transmission under 308(1)
in other than the two generally accepted instances, 4 but distinguished these from the present case. The court maintained
that to approve the method of service in the instant case would
render CPLR 308(1) similar to 308(3) without that section's
safeguard of prior due diligence to make personal service.
The wisdom of the court's decision in the instant case is
apparent. Much of the service performed presently is suspect.
To expand the exceptions to 308(1) beyond a bare minimum
853

Misc. 2d 279, 278 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967).

9 While the record was unclear as to whether delivery had been made
by one Savidge, a co-defendant, or Savidge's wife, not a party to the
action, the Court assumed for purposes of its opinion that delivery had
been made by the wife, since delivery by Savidge would have been void
under CPLR 2103(a).
10 "Personal service upon a natural person shall be made: (1) by
delivering the summons within the state to the person to be served. . .
CPLR 308(1).
11 Miller v. Alda Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 279-80, 278 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. 1967).
22 Green v. Morningside Heights
Housing Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 124,
125, 177 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 7 App. Div.
2d 708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1st Dep't 1958).
13 See Buscher v. Ehrick, 12 App. Div. 2d 887, 209 N.Y.S.2d 941
(4th
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14 See, e.g., Marcy v. Woodin, 18 App. Div. 2d 944, 237 N.Y.S.2d 402
(3d Dep't 1963); Erale v. Edwards, 47 Misc. 2d 213, 262 N.Y.S.2d 44
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1965). The Erale case is treated in length in
The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JOHN's L. R.v.
303, 313 (1966).

